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The “deviant current” or “current of deviation” (Persian: جریان انحرافی, romanized: Jarīān-e Enherāfī) is a term used by Iranian officials (e.g. high-ranking clerics, Revolutionary Guards commanders)[39] and principlist rivals[39] of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to describe Ahmadinejad’s entourage,[40] which functions like a faction[41] or party.[42] Ahmadinejad had some tendency toward Iranian nationalism that deviated from the clerics’ theocratic rule, hence top clerics labeled the faction associated with him as “deviant current”.[43]

The term was coined in 2011, after an open conflict between Ahmadinejad and the Supreme leader Ali Khamenei.[44][45]

People

People who have been described as associated with the “deviant current” include:

Mojtaba Khamenei who is the current Supreme Leader of Iran was affiliated with Ahmadinejad, however not with the group.[58][59][60][61][62]

Ideology

The faction is described as “nationalist conservative” by Stratfor;[63] also described as “neo-conservative nationalists” by Pejman Abdolmohammadi, assistant professor in Middle Eastern studies at University of Trento and Giampiero Cama, professor of comparative politics at University of Genova.[64] According to Bernd Kaussler, assistant professor of political science at James Madison University, their ideology is a combination of millenarian, nationalist, populist and the principlist rhetoric.[10] The tendency tries to nationalize Shiite Islamism, and advocates an “Iranian School of Islam” that seems antagonistic toward the Velayat Faqih, an idea that formed the basis of the current establishment in Iran.[10] Ahmadinejad and his associates have regularly used the word “spring” and the phrase “Long live the spring” as a slogan, which is believed to have connotations for the Arab Spring, although Ahmadinejad claims it refers to the reappearance of Imam Mahdi.[65]

Organization

See also: Coalition of the Pleasant Scent of Servitude, Monotheism and Justice Front, Supporters of Justice Discourse of Islamic Revolution, and YEKTA Front

A group is active under the acronym HOMA (standing for Havadarn-e Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in Persian, meaning “Supporters of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad”) and published an online newspaper with the same name. The public relations team organizes various websites, including Dolat-e Bahar (lit. ‘Government of Spring‘), Rais Jomhur-e ma (lit. ‘Our President‘) and Meydan-e Haftadodo (lit. ‘Square 72‘, named after the neighborhood Ahmadinejad lives in) among others. They maintain online activity elsewhere, running many blogs and social media accounts.[66][67]

Electoral performance

2012

Monotheism and Justice Front, a group that endorsed a list of candidates for 2012 parliamentary elections is reportedly linked to Mashaei.[68] The results showed a major defeat for them in the elections,[63] and they only won 9 seats, according to Deutsche Welle.[69]

2013

In a Medvedev/Putin-style scenario, Mashaei ran for president in 2013 presidential election backed by Ahmadinejad, who said “Mashaei means Ahmadinejad and Ahmadinejad means Mashaei”.[70] He was disqualified by the Guardian Council.

2013 local elections were the next defeat. The faction were unable to secure a seat in Tehran City Council and even Parvin, Ahmadinejad’s sister was unseated.[71]

2017

In 2017 presidential election, Ahmdinejad who backed Hamid Baghaei, registered as a candidate along with him,[72] but both were disqualified.[73]

2020

Candidates associated with the circle ran on a list for 2020 parliamentary elections, although Ahmadinejad himself did not support any specific list.[74] Middle East Research and Information Project stated that they won 14 seats in the first round of elections.[75]

See also

Notes

  1. ^ a b The “deviant current” is considered a radical or hardliner even within the far-right Principlist faction, but is also referred to as “left-wing“[29] due to economic populism[30][31][32][33] influenced by Third World socialism.[34] Ahmadinejad however saw himself as neither right nor left, but for a Third Stream.[35] Ahmadinejad often built an incendiary anti-Israel retoric,[36] and critics are criticising them for their links to Western antisemitic far-right (particularly neo-Nazi) propaganda.[37][38]

References

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  2. ^ https://intpolicydigest.org/ahmadinejad-gone-ahmadinejadism/
  3. ^ James Reynolds (24 November 2010). “Why some Iran conservatives are turning against Ahmadinejad”. BBC News. President Ahmadinejad represents the ultra-conservatives – a populist movement led by pious, austere veterans of the Iran-Iraq War.
  4. ^ a b “Iranian president Ahmadinejad is identified with Messianism, one of the factors contributing to the further radicalization of the regime but also challenging the rule of the mullahs”. terrorism-info.org.il. 4 March 2007. Even though President Ahmadinejad is associated with Messianism, it still carries little weight in the Iranian regime. However, should it gain ground and begin to influence Iran’s decision-making, coupled with a strengthening of Ahmadinejad’s status and that of the ultra-conservative faction, it is possible that Iran’s inner consensus will shift in a religious-ideological direction that will further radicalize its policy.
  5. ^ “Mahmoud Ahmadinejad”. jewishvirtuallibrary.org. Ahmadinejad is widely considered to be a religious, ultra-conservative Islamist, with a commitment to an agenda of economic populism and sociopolitical conservatism, bearing ample resemblance to the Taliban’s.
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  7. ^ a b Tahreem Shahid; Muhammad Shoaib Jamil. “The Dynamics of Right-Wing Populism: A Comparative Study of Political Leadership and Institutional Impact in Pakistan and Iran”. ojs.plhr.org.pk.
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  9. ^ Rory Carroll; Sibylla Brodzinsky (25 July 2007). “The Holocaust denier, the radical socialist, and their axis of unity”. The Guardian. They make for an odd couple. Hugo Chávez, big and bear-like, is a radical socialist who quotes Marx, leads a largely Catholic country and has a habit of breaking into song. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, bird-like in comparison, is a radical Islamist who quotes the prophet Muhammad and is not readily associated with fun or secularism.
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  16. ^ David Kampf. “Collapse of Capitalism”. Foreign Policy Association. Archived from the original on 14 January 2026. Retrieved 23 March 2026. In a speech to regional leaders during a summit of the 10-nation Economic Cooperation Organization, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad argued capitalism is on the verge of collapse. “After the collapse of the closed socialist economy, the capitalist economy is also on the verge of collapse,” Ahmadinejad said in a speech. “The liberal economy and the free market have failed,” he said, pointing to the use of “thousands of billions of dollars” to bail out Western banks and companies.
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  23. ^ Victor Davis Hanson (30 April 2006). “The End of Days”. Hoover Institute. As a Third World populist, Ahmadinejad expects that his own fascism will escape scrutiny if he just recites enough times the past sins of the West. He also understands victimology. So he also knows that to destroy the Israelis, he—not they—must become the victim and that the Europeans must be the ones who forced his hand.
  24. ^ Patrick Clawson (30 June 2005). “Next Generation”. Archived from the original on 14 May 2024. Retrieved 24 March 2026. Last week, Iranians elected a proto-fascist as president. The rise of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, formerly the mayor of Tehran, was a blow to the vibrant reform movement that swept Mohammed Khatami to the presidency in 1997. Ahmadinejad’s extreme social conservatism—which bears plenty of resemblance to the Taliban’s—and his economic populism have thus far dominated the Western media’s coverage of the results, and understandably so.
  25. ^ [22][23][24]
  26. ^ John A. Tures (22 April 2009). “Rattling the Hesam: International Distractions from Internal Problems in Iran”. Wiley Online Library. As Middle East Institute scholar Alex Vatanka (2008) observes, “[t]he likelihood that Ahmadinejad and his far right political base in Iran can be outflanked at home.” […]
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  29. ^ Ali Sodayi (2 November 2018). “How Iran’s Ahmadinejad found meaning in rap”. BBC News. It was a worldview that drew him to left-wing politics and liberation movements in other countries, and to leaders like Venezuela’s Hugo Chavez and Bolivia’s Evo Morales – often against the wishes of more traditional hardliners in the Iranian establishment.
  30. ^ Bill Spindle (30 June 2006). “Behind the Rise of Iran’s President: A Populist Economic Agenda”. Yale University. TEHRAN – Iran’s new president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, has grabbed the world’s attention with his bombast over Tehran’s nuclear program and saber rattling against Israel. At home, however, the president’s popularity is soaring thanks to another reason: his enthusiastic embrace of economic populism.
  31. ^ Ray Takeyh. “A Profile in Defiance: Being Mahmoud Ahmadinejad”. The National Interest. Although it may be difficult for a Western audience to appreciate, Ahmadinejad’s message of economic populism and nationalistic self-assertion does enjoy a level of public support, particularly among the lower classes struggling with Iran’s inequalities.
  32. ^ Nader Habaibi. ““Economic Legacy of Mahmud Ahmadinejad”“ (PDF). Brandeis University. Some have described Ahmadinejad as a protégé of the Supreme Leader.2 There are many indications that Khamenei indeed approved of Ahmadinejad’s populist economic views,3 and his support helped Ahmadinejad overcome resistance in the parliament to some of the programs he sought to institute.
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