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Polylogism is the epistemological belief that different groups of people, such as those defined by race, class, or nation, reason in fundamentally different ways.^[1] The term was popularized by the Austrian economist and social theorist Ludwig von Mises to describe and criticize theories that treat human logic as relative to one’s social, biological, or historical background.^[2] Mises identified several manifestations of this concept, most notably “Marxian polylogism”, which posits distinct “bourgeois” and “proletarian” logics, and “racial polylogism”, which attributes varying logical structures to different races.^[3]

In foundational texts such as Human Action and Theory and History, Mises argued that polylogism fails because its proponents never systematically outline these alleged alternative logics.^[3] Mises asserted that attributing an argument to an author’s background is often used as an ad hominem tool to dismiss unwelcome theories, particularly in economics, without analytically engaging with the arguments themselves.^[4] While acknowledging that personal values, interests, and historical context heavily influence human judgment, Mises maintained that the fundamental mechanics of logic remain universal.

Following Mises, the concept of polylogism has primarily been examined within Austrian economic methodology, hermeneutics, and political philosophy. Later scholars have expanded on the term to warn against the risks of epistemological subjectivism, with some arguing that separating the logical capacities of groups can fuel political collectivism and justify conflict.^[5] Contemporary academic debates continue to explore the nuances of Mises’s rejection of polylogism and its implications for the interpretation of his methodological apriorism.

The word polylogism combines the Greek-derived elements poly- (“many”) and logos (“reason”, “word”, or “logic”). Pierre Perrin writes that the term “seems to have been coined by Mises”, and defines it as an epistemological view according to which “the logical structure of the mind is substantially different between human groups”.^[6]

Mises developed the term in several methodological works, including Human Action and Theory and History. In Human Action, he identified “Marxian polylogism” with the view that different social classes possess different logical structures, and “racial polylogism” with the view that different races possess different logical structures.^[3] In Theory and History, he connected polylogism with broader debates about historicism, determinism, Marxism, and the epistemological status of the sciences of human action.^[7]

Mises argued that polylogism fails because it does not specify the alleged alternative systems of logic. In his view, it is insufficient to reject an argument by saying that its author belongs to a particular class, race, or nation. A critic would first have to describe the alternative logic, then show where the disputed argument is invalid under that logic, and finally show what conclusions follow when the alleged correct logic is applied.^[3]

For Mises, the issue was especially important in economics. He argued that the validity of a theorem such as the theory of comparative advantage does not depend on the class, nationality, or ethnicity of the economist who formulated it. A theory, he held, must be examined by reasoned argument rather than by “unmasking” the author’s social background or motives.^[4]

Mises also distinguished polylogism from the weaker claim that people differ in values, interests, and historical understanding. He accepted that biography and social circumstances may influence judgments of value and interpretation, but denied that this implied separate logics for different groups.^[8]

In Human Action, Mises distinguished between racial polylogism, which attributes different logics to different races (so that “the logic of the Aryans differs from the logic of the non-Aryans”), and Marxian polylogism, which attributes different logics to different social classes (so that “the logic of the proletarians differs from the logic of the bourgeois”). Without giving it a name, he also suggested that a form of polylogism may attribute different logics to different nations (so that “the logic of the Germans from the logic of the French or the British“).^[3]

In a critique of certain hermeneutic approaches to economics, Pierre Perrin defined what he called progressive evolutionary polylogism, in which the logical structure of the mind is said to evolve with history or social development.^[6] Perrin used this term to argue that excessive emphasis on the contextual nature of knowledge can lead to a form of polylogism.^[6]

After Mises, the term has been used mainly in discussions of Austrian economic methodology, hermeneutics, and political philosophy. Roderick T. Long, in a 2004 article in The Review of Austrian Economics, treated polylogism as part of Mises’s anti-psychologism and argued that Wittgenstein’s rule-following considerations could be used to defend the Misesian claim that the laws of economics are a priori rather than empirical.^[9] Subsequent Austrian-school literature has used Long’s treatment to distinguish between normative polylogism, the claim that different groups each have their own valid logic, and descriptive polylogism, the claim that different groups may in fact follow different inferential rules, even if not all such rules are valid.^[10]

Pierre Perrin used Mises’s terminology in his 2005 article “Hermeneutic economics: Between relativism and progressive polylogism”.^[6] Perrin argued that some hermeneutic approaches in economics risk moving from the weaker claim that knowledge is contextual to a stronger “progressive polylogism”, according to which the logical structure of the mind changes with historical or social development.^[6]

In political philosophy, Alexander Moseley employed the term outside strictly economic methodology. In A Philosophy of War, Moseley argued that theories differentiating the epistemological capacities of groups, which he identified as polylogism, tend toward political collectivism and can support rationalizations of aggressive war.^[5] In his article on political philosophy for the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Moseley similarly described polylogism as the view that there is, or ought to be, more than one form of logic, and associated it with epistemological subjectivism.^[11]

More recent scholarship has treated polylogism as an issue in the interpretation of Mises’s apriorism. Alexander Linsbichler’s 2017 reconstruction of Mises’s philosophy of science identifies the rejection of polylogism as one of Mises’s methodological commitments.^[12] Scott Scheall argued in 2017 that Mises’s argument did not by itself “rule out polylogism and establish monologism”.^[13] In a later article, Scheall maintained that rejecting class- or race-relative logic does not show that logic could not be relative in any other sense, treating the issue as part of a broader difficulty in interpreting Mises’s methodological apriorism.^[14]

Books by Ludwig von Mises that popularized the concept are freely available online:

• Human Action by Ludwig von Mises
• Theory and History by Ludwig von Mises