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The siege of Breslau was an 80-day-long combat for Breslau; it formed part of the Lower Silesian offensive during final stages of World War Two in Europe. The German garrison, composed of one infantry division and various autonomous units, fought having been fully encircled. The advancing Soviets relied on 6. Army and various delegated units.

The battle was divided into a few assaults, punctuated by periods of less intense combat: 1) failed initial attempts to seize Breslau, Jan 25-Jan 27; 2) encirclement, Feb 4-Feb 15; 3) approaches to assume assault positions, Feb 15-Feb 27; 4) failed assault from the south, Mar 1-Mar 10; 5) taking of Klein Gandau airport, Mar 31-Apr 8; 6) failed assault from the west, Apr 18-Apr 28. The German garrison laid down arms having learnt that Berlin had surrendered 2 days before.

Along Stalingrad, Budapest, Manila and Berlin, the siege stands out as one of the most heavily fought cases of urban combat during World War Two. Out of about 130,000 combatants at least 15,000 were killed and some 50,000 were wounded. It is estimated that around 80,000 civilians perished in the besieged city. Some 50% of buildings were damaged, and around 30% were totally destroyed.

According to plans of the future offensive, developed by the Soviet general staff, Breslau was likely to be in operational zone of the 1. Ukrainian Front. Commanded by marshal Konev, along the 1. Belorussian Front of marshal Zhukov it was one of the 2 strongest formations of this order in the Red Army. By the end of 1944 it held the 350-km-long section of the frontline between Warsaw and the Carpathian Mountains and during an operational pause it was getting ready for another assault. Its objectives, specified on November 29, 1944, included capturing Cracow, the Upper Silesian industrial basin, and Lower Silesia.^[21] The most important target, however, was reaching the Oder in its middle-lower course, below its confluence with the Neisse; this would, in turn, later serve as a springboard for the future final offensive towards Berlin. The orders specified neither the timing nor detailed troop lineup for the future assault on Breslau.^[22] The Germans, uncapable of offensive action and overstreched in defensive positions,^{[note 2]} were organised in Army Group “Centre” (general Reinhard) in the north and Army Group “A” in the south (general Harpe). The latter, holding the frontline opposite the 1. Ukrainian Front, was composed of (north to south) 9. Army (Lüttwitz), 4. Panzer Army (Gräser), 17. Army (Schulz) and 1. Panzer Army (Heinrici).^[24]

The Soviet assault, launched on January 12, 1945 and later to be known as the Vistula-Oder Offensive, was from the onset massively successful.^[25] On the right flank the sparheading formation of the 1. Ukrainian Front was the 3. Guards Tank Army of general Rybalko; on January 16 it captured Częstochowa, some 150 km from Breslau.^[26] Either on this or on the following day Rybalko’s staff prepared the first plan to capture Breslau.^[27] His tank corpses, divided into 2 groups, were to reach the outskirts of the city on January 25 and commence a pincer assault, which on January 27 would produce the seizure of the city. The army proceeded as planned, and on January 19 its vanguard units reached the town of Wieruszów, some 80 km from Breslau and located on the pre-1939 frontier between Poland and Germany.^[28] However, on January 20 Konev ordered Rybalko to turn south, towards Oppeln, apparently intending to trap German troops fighting in Upper Silesia in a kessel.^[29] Rybalko’s plan to capture Breslau was abandoned. According to a present-day historian the scheme was ambitious yet realistic, especially given the opposing German 17. Army was in total disarray and barely capable of mounting a co-ordinated defense. Re-directing the 3. Guards Tank Army is referred as Konev’s mistake; eventually the Upper Silesian kessel did not materialize, and instead of swift takeover Breslau would be subject to long and heavy combat.^{[30][note 4]}

The operational zone vacated by the 3. Guards Tank Army was taken over by the 52. Army, unlike the former a rather standard field formation, with limited armour and mechanised potential; it was commanded by general Koroteev. On January 20-23 its right-flank unit, the 73. Rifle Corps, was engaged around Kępno and Gross Wartenberg against hastily assembled German troops. They consisted of 269. Infantry Division and Kampfgruppe “Krafft”,^{[32][note 5]} both units of the XXXXVIII Corps, which in turn formed part of almost disintegrated and withdrawing 17. Army of general Schulz.^{[note 6]} Gross Wartenberg (50 km from Breslau) was taken on January 23^[35] and the fightings moved towards Oels (25 km from Breslau), which in turn fell on January 25.^{[36][note 7]} On January 26 first units of the Soviet 73. Rifle Corps neared the Weide, a small right tributary of the Oder, flowing on the north-eastern outskirts of Breslau (some 8-10 from the centre of the city). It is here that the 269. ID and KG “Krafft” mounted a defensive line which stopped the Soviets. Following 2 days of fighting and with no apparent success, on January 27 general Martirosian, commander of the 73. Rifle Corps, ordered his man to assume defensive positions. The attempt to capture Breslau offhand failed.^{[38][note 8]}

Koroteev altered his strategy. While the right-flank 73. Rifle Corps was storming northern perimeter of Breslau, the 78. Rifle Corps (general Akimov), also forming part of the 52. Army, was ordered to establish bridgeheads south-east, in-between Breslau and Ohlau. The left bank of the Oder was defended by a motley assortment of various German sub-units, including Ersatz battalions, NCO-school battalions, Luftwaffe men organized as infantry, Volkssturm, loose artillery batteries and minor tank detachments. On January 26 the Soviets managed to cross the river in few spots near the villages of Märzdorf (20 km south-east of the centre of Breslau) and Wasserborn (10 km). During next week the intense combat followed. The position of Red Army soldiers at Wasserborn became dire and eventually their regiment from the 31. Rifle Division became fully encircled. Some of its components managed to break through, yet on February 3 the bridgehead was lost. At Märzdorf neither the Soviets managed to deliver a breakthrough punch nor the Germans succeeded in pushing them back to the Oder. As apparently both sides ran out of resources, their positions stalled. Either on February 2 or the following day the 78. Rifle Corps was given new orders, and soon the entire 52. Army would be directed elsewhere.^[40]

Having failed to cross the Weide on January 26-28, Martirosian shifted his focus. On January 28 first soldiers of the 73. Rifle Corps appeared near the confluence of the Weide and the Oder, some 9 km from north-western suburbs of Breslau. Amidst heavy fighting against improvised German sub-units from training and logistics formations the following day the Soviets crossed the partially frozen Oder and established a bridgehead near the village of Peiskerwitz.^{[note 10]} During the following 10 days it became the object of extremely fierce combat between the 50. Rifle Division and then its replacement, 254. Rifle Division (all 73. Rifle Corps), and the Germans, reinforced by the 1. SS Fortress Regiment “Besslein”.^{[note 11]} Eventually on February 10 the Soviets evacuated the bridgehead.^[44] During this period fightings along the Weide continued; local attacks and counter-attacks moved the frontline here and there, yet no breakthrough has been achieved. The defence strengthened, as new units, raised in the city, were being deployed, above all the Fortress Grenadier Regiment “Sauer”.^{[note 12]} Eventually, in mid-February the entire 52. Army was given other tasks. Only one of its divisions, the 294. Rifle Division, was seconded to the newly approaching 6. Army and remained along the Weide blocking the city from the north. Another attempt to seize Breslau failed.^[46]

In the very late January of 1945 the Vistula-Oder Offensive was entering its late phase; the 1. Belorussian Front was approaching the lower Oder and its vanguard units were already some 150 km from Berlin. The frontline in Lower Silesia was running largely along the Oder; the right wing of the 1. Ukrainian Front reached the outskirts of Glogau, and the left wing was in the Moravian Gate, where the upper Oder flows between the Carpathians and the Sudetes. On January 31 Konev issued new orders: his northern armies were to reach towards and then cross the lower Neisse, while southern armies were to perform a breakthrough raid between the Oder and the Sudetes and cross the upper Neisse; final objectives for the 1. Ukrainian Front were already in Saxony and Brandenburg. Two large bridgeheads were to serve as springboards of the campaign, later to be named the Lower Silesian Offensive: near Steinau–Maltsch 45 km north-west of Breslau and near Ohlau-Brieg 35 km south-east of Breslau.^[47] It was expected that around February 5-6 Breslau would be encircled, and around February 10 the city would be captured.^[48] At the time Lower Silesia was defended by Army Group “Center” of general Schörner^{[note 13]} (re-organised former Army Group “A”);^[49] it consisted of 4. Panzer Army in the north (Gräser), 17. Army in the center (Schulz) and 1. Panzer Army in the south (Heinrici).

The right flank of the Soviet force assembled in the Ohlau-Brieg bridgehead was the 5. Guards Army, commanded by general Zhadov. It commenced the offensive on February 4,^[50] though its result was disappointing. During 5 days of combat the Soviets advanced no more than 10-15 km; they were opposed by armoured and infantry divisions of the XVII. Corps (Tiemann) and the Korpsgruppe “Breslau” (Koch-Erpach), both from the 17. Army. The breakthrough was achieved on February 11 by the 34. Guards Rifle Corps, and on February 12 the Soviet riflemen reached the railway line, leading south from Breslau to Glatz and then across the Sudetes to Bohemia.^[51] As at the time the right arm of the Soviet advance was well in progress, the encirclement of Breslau was getting increasingly likely, and the corridor linking Breslau with the Sudete foothills was only some 15 km wide. For a moment the German counter-attack broadened it,^[52] yet Soviet superiority was clear and on February 13 they units of the 5. Guards Army and the 6. Army met; some German units, like the 269. ID, were getting split, some sub-units pushed north towards Breslau, and some south towards the Sudetes. German counter-attacked briefly re-opened the corridor, but on February 16 the 33. Guards Rifle Corps reached Domslau, Kanth and Kostenblut south-west of Breslau.^[53]

The left flank of the Soviet armies assembled in the Steinau-Maltsch bridgehead was formed by the 6. Army of general Gluzdovsky.^{[note 14]} He was ordered to move south, then east, and finally north – to Breslau.^{[note 15]} The timeline was ambitious: Konev’s order expected the 6. Army to capture Breslau “on the fourth day of the operation”.^[56] The 6. Army commenced their assault on February 8^[57] and was fairly successful, even though its right-wing units were delayed by fightings in Liegnitz.^[58] On February 9 its left flank reached the outskirts of Neumarkt. On the same day the strong 7. Guards Mechanized Corps^[59] (the formation subordinated directly to command of the 1. Ukrainian Front and deployed to assist the 6. Army) reached the Breslau – Berlin highway.^[60] Tanks of the corps immediately turned east but were confronted by 8. Panzer Division from the 17. Army. On February 11-12 the frontline seemed stabilised, as the Soviet 74. Rifle Corps remained blocked at Neumarkt and the German XVII. Corps failed to push the Soviets away from the highway. However, on February 13^[61] the 7. Guards Mechanized Corps – perhaps the key unit to be credited for the successful encirclement^[62] – achieved a breakthrough, penetrated some 17-18 km west of Breslau and at Rothsürben its vanguard units met troops from the 5. Guards Army.^[63] Germans counter-attacks briefly re-opened the corridor,^[64] but on February 15 it was soon closed again.^[65] On February 16 Konev wired Moscow that Breslau was now fully and firmly surrounded.^[66]

Before the incorporation of Austria, Breslau was together with Dresden the 7-8th largest German city, after Berlin, Hamburg, Munich, Cologne, Leipzig and Essen; in 1938 its population was around 630,000 people.^[67] Though thousands of young males have been drafted, during the war the population grew significantly. They major reason was accommodating refugees from large western cities; as Hamburg or Cologne were subject to massive British and American bombardments, Breslau remained almost beyond the range of Allied aircraft. It was dubbed Luftschutzbunker des III. Reiches^{[note 16]} and the city hosted hundreds of thousands of women, children and the elderly, transported from the West.^[69] There were also many forced laborers, in huge numbers brought from all over Europe.^[70] It is estimated that there were perhaps 1m inhabitants in late 1944;^[71] if so, at that time Breslau was – after Berlin, Vienna and Hamburg – the 4th largest German city.^{[note 17]}

In October 1944 the Soviets commenced bombing raids over Breslau.^[73] They produced very little damage,^[74] yet with the frontline some 300 km away, in late December the local military suggested that limited evacuation of civilians should begin. Though Deutsche Reichsbahn seriously considered departures of 100 trains daily for a week or so,^[75] the proposal was rejected by the highest civilian authority in Lower Silesia, the Oberpräsident and NSDAP Gauleiter Hanke.^[76] It was only on January 19, two days after combat alert had been declared for the Breslau garrison and with the Soviets 80 km away, that Hanke ordered almost all civilians to leave the city. The order was implemented immediately. Since January 20 borough NSDAP functionaries were knocking at all doors calling to pack up; first to be evacuated was the right-bank Oder Vorstadt district.^[77] The situation soon got out of hand. Tens of thousands were storming railway terminals, trying to board departing passenger and cargo trains; some institutions managed to organize evacuation by trucks,^[78] yet massive flows of people, mostly women, children and the elderly, usually with improvised transportation means, appeared on roads leading east and especially south of Breslau.^[79] It is estimated that during the next 3 weeks as much as some 0.7m people might have left the city,^[80] mostly towards the Sudete foothills. In harsh winter conditions and with temperatures at night dropping to -20C (thaw arrived in early February),^{[note 18]} an uspecified number – estimates differ from 90,000^[83] to 200,000^[84] – perished.^{[note 19]} Many opted for suicide instead of departing in snow and freezing temperatures into the unknown.^{[note 20]}

It is not clear how many civilians remained in the city in early February; estimates range between 80,000 and 300,000.^{[note 21]} One category were these who were ordered but refused to leave; given such people were usually no longer receiving ration stamps, they were probably rather few. Other categories comprised females from auxiliary services (e.g. in lazarets), males subject to Volkssturm service, people who were deemed necessary in single factories that remained operational, and forced laborers (usually digging trenches or in other construction works). Though some highly positioned individuals were allowed to leave (e.g. the Catholic archbishop Bertram or the Evangelic Konsistorialpräsident Hosemann),^{[note 22][note 23]} those holding high admin roles, like the mayor of Breslau Leichtenstern, were supposed to stay; the deputy mayor Spielhagen, who without permission left on January 21, was summoned back and publicly executed on January 28.^{[note 24][note 25]} The outflow of civlians, though now on minor scale, continued almost until the city was fully encircled; last evacuation trains departed on February 8.^[97] Schlesische Tageszeitung – soon to be renamed and reduced to bulletin^{[note 26]} – was being published, and municipal services, including trams, kept operating until late March.^{[note 27]} On February 9 the Reichsjugendführer Axmann flew to the city to raise spirits of the VS teenagers.^[101] Since March 7 all civilians (including boys over 10 and girls over 12) were obliged to work.^{[note 28]}

It is not clear whether the Breslau fortress was subordinated to command of the 17. Army or directly to command of the Army Group “Center”.^{[note 30]} The first commander of the fortress garrison was Generalmajor Johannes Krause;^{[note 31]} on February 3, 1945 he was replaced^{[note 32]} by Hans von Ahlfen, freshly nominated from Oberst to Generalmajor. On March 8, 1945 von Ahlfen was in turn replaced by Generalleutnant Hermann Niehoff.^{[note 33][note 34]} Initially the only other general present was Generalleutnant Rudolf Koch-Erpach, head of the VIII. Military District (Lower Silesia); in late January he left, nominated commander of a panzer corps.^[115] In early February Generalmajor Siegfried Ruff was flown to Breslau to assume command of the 609. division (in March promoted to Generalleutnant).^{[note 35]} The only other general briefly present – though not member of the garrison – was Generalleutnant der Luftwaffe Friedrich Cranz,^{[note 36]} who in mid-March arrived in Breslau by plane to inspect airfield facilities; he died on March 17 when for unclear reasons his plane failed to take off from the Klein Gandau airstrip.^[119] The chief of staff was initially a young captain Hans-Wilhelm Erdmann.^{[note 37]} Once von Ahlfen assumed command, this role was taken over by major Albrecht Otto.^{[note 38][note 39]} In early April Otto was about to be dismissed and his replacement was already appointed by OKH; however, for reasons which are unclear he failed to make it to Breslau and Otto remained the chief of staff until surrender.^[124] Volkssturm was commanded by SA-Obergruppenführer Otto Herzog.^[125] Headquarters of the Breslau garrison was initially located in Liebichshöhe;^{[note 40]} on April 14 it was moved to the former Augustian convent.

It was initially planned to defend Breslau with 5 infantry divisions, the idea which evaporated upon near disintegration of the Eastern Front in January 1945.^[127] Eventually the core of German garrison of Breslau was composed of 2 formations: 1) autonomous fortress regiments and 2) the 609. Division. The fortress regiments (Festungs-Grenadier-Regiment) were initially named A, C, D, E and B,^[128] later to be re-named after their commanders.^{[note 41]} They were raised in early 1945 usually on basis of existing local Lower Silesian sub-units, e.g. regiment A on basis of Aufklärungs-Ersatz- und Ausbildungs-Abteilung in Oels, regiment D on basis of 1. SS-Ersatz- and Ausbildungs-Bataillon in Deutsch Lissa, and regiment E on basis of Luftwaffe ground staff from closed or evacuated airfields.^[129] The 609. z.b.V. Division^{[note 42]} had its staff formed in late January in Dresden; also in this case the division was raised mostly on basis of existing units, like 8. Wehrmacht-Unteroffizierschule in Frankenstein, though some evacuated from distant locations, like 48. Ersatz- und Ausbildungs Flugabwehrkannonenabteilung from Hohensalza. Perhaps the most experienced sub-units of the division were battalions from the 269. Infantry Division, which in January manned the frontline on approaches to Breslau; the division partially broke apart during encirclement, and part of it was pushed to the city.^[130] Specialised and support sub-units were either raised in Breslau and surroundings or withdrew to the city during earlier combat. Military police were combing road crossings and railway terminals for soldiers from disintegrated units, marauders, these on leave, convalescents etc., who were all directed to replenishment centres. Volkssturm, raised in Breslau but also in other Lower Silesian cities, were divided into combat and construction battalions.^[131] For administrative purposes the former were organized in regiment groups (Regimentsgruppe), yet in combat VS did not operate on their own and the battalions were usually attached to Wehrmacht regiments.^[132] Estimates as to the number of German combatants differ enormously. Some historians provide figures as low as 35,000,^[133] 37,000^[134] or “probably fewer than 40,000”.^[135] Ahlfen and Niehoff in their book claimed 45,000-50,000;^{[note 43]} this latter figure is fairly frequently repeated in historiographic accounts.^[138] In latest monograph one scholar arrived at 55,000.^{[note 44]} Some settle for estimates as high as 70,000^{[note 45]} or even 80,000.^{[note 46]}

Artillery was integrated in Artillerie Regiment “Breslau”, commanded by sub-colonel Egmont Urbatis.^{[note 47]} Divided into 4 major groups (Gruppe Nord, Grupe West, Gruppe Südwest and artillery of the 609th division),^[142] it was a rather motley collection built on basis of various sub-units from Breslau and around; in total, it operated some 200 artillery pieces. Perhaps the most important type were 10.5 mm leFH 18/40 howitzers, divided into 15 batteries; many were brand new, produced by Borsig Werke in Markstädt.^[143] Heavy howitzers were represented by 4 batteries of 15 mm sFH 18. The heaviest fire was possible thanks to 1 battery of 21 mm Granatwerfer GR 19. There were 4 batteries made of Soviet artillery pieces (e.g. A-19, ZIS-3) and 2 batteries made of pieces from Polish and Yugoslav armies,^[144] mostly the French Schneider Mle 1897. A separate AA artillery formation (not subordinated to Urbatis) was formed on basis of 150. Schwere Flak Artillerie Regiment; its core were some 90 famous 8.8 cm guns in various versions, apart from Flak 36, 37, 41 and 43 pieces and other single units.^[145] Self-propelled artillery was reduced to a single company, named Gepanzerte Kampfgruppe “Venzke”. Its vehicles were 2 Jagdpanzer IV/70 L guns, 2 unidentified guns on Pzkpfw III chassis (perhaps StuG III), 6 StuG 40 ausf. G guns, 6 Pzkpfw II ausf. F tanks,^{[note 48]} and 4 Sd.Kfz. 124 Wespe howitzers.^[148] Firepower was delivered also by armored train, built by the Breslau FAMO^{[note 49]} shortly or perhaps even during the siege; its key weapon were 8.8 cm guns and it was manned by some 70 soldiers and railwaymen.^[150]

Garrison of Festung Breslau:^{[note 51]}

type	regiment or other	# of battalions or equivalent	manpower	manpower sub-total
staff and command	–	1	500	500
fortress regiments	SS “Besslein”	4	2,000	12,500
	“Hanf”	3	1,500
	“Mohr”	4	2,000
	“Sauer”	4	2,000
	“Wehl”	6	3,000
	ersatz, other etc	4	2,000
609. z.b.V. Division	“Kersten”	4	2,000	7,000
	“Reinkober”	2	1,000
	“Schulz”	4	2,000
	ersatz, other etc	4	2,000
various military	artillery	2	1,500	11,500
	paratroopers	2	1,000
	anti-tank	1	500
	pioneer	5	2,500
	logistics	2	1,000
	communications	3	1,500
	sanitary	1	500
	military police	2	1,000
	other	4	2,000
various militarised	firebrigade	1	500	4,000
	police	3	1,500
	Wachbataillon	2	1,000
	plant security etc	1	500
	Bahnschutz	1	500
Volkssturm	combat	26	13,000	19,000
	construction	10	5,000
	ersatz	2	1,000

During the encirclement there were 2 Soviet armies engaged in combat: 6. Army and 5. Guards Army. During the very first days of the siege one formation of latter, namely the 34. Rifle Corps, was storming the city from south-east, along the left bank of the Oder; they made rather little progress. Some divisions of the corps were being withdrawn from the frontline since February 19, and the remaining ones left on February 22. Their positions were taken over by units of the 6. Army.^[153] Hence, the 5. Guards Army is not accounted for in this section.

The 6. Army (6-я общевойсковая армия) was subordinated to command of the 1. Ukrainian Front. Since late 1944 its commander was general lieutenant Vladimir A. Gluzdovsky; the chief of staff was since March 1944 general major Fiodor D. Kulishev. Apart from them the members of the War Council, a specific military-political body operational in the Red Army of the time which formed part of the army command layer, were general major of aviation Vasiliy I. Klokov^{[note 52]} and colonel Piotr T. Taran. The backbone of the army were 2 rifle corpses (стрелковый корпус). The 22. Rifle Corps was commanded by colonel Fyedor V. Zakharov; of its 2 divisions, the 218. Rifle Division was led by colonel Piotr S. Yeroshenko, and the 309. Rifle Division by colonel Boris D. Lev. The 74. Rifle Corps was commanded by Alexandr V. Vorozhyshev. Out of its 3 divisions, the 181. Rifle Division was commanded by colonel Pavel I. Morozov, the 273. Rifle Division by colonel Dmitriy P. Sinkin^{[note 53]} and the 359. Rifle Division by colonel Piotr P. Kosolapov. The army artillery was led by general major Vladimir A. Kvashnevskiy^{[note 54]} and mechanised units by colonel Piotr D. Bobkovskiy.^{[note 55]} Another notable leader was colonel Ivan. A. Pyerepelitsa,^{[note 56]} commander of the 294. Rifle Division; originally part of the 52. Army and bogged down at the northern outskirts of Breslau, it was ordered to block the city and subordinated to command of the 6. Army.^{[note 57]} One more and the 4th general involved on the Soviet side was general major Danil M. Krasnokutskiy, who commanded the strongest non-organic unit delegated to the 6. Army, the 31. Breakthrough Artillery Division. Headquarters of the 6. Army was initially located in Wilkau; on February 21 it was moved to the von Bonim palace in Gross Gohlau.^{[160][note 58]}

A present-day scholar puts the 6. Army in the rubric of at best mediocre. Though a formation of this designation was operational on the Eastern Front until the mid-1944, during the spring fightings in Ukraine it suffered so heavy losses that its divisions were transferred to other armies, while staff and skeletal structures were placed in reserve. The army was being re-built since late 1944, mostly with recruits drafted in the summer and fall in the Volhynia region. Most recruits got drafted from rural settlements and were unaccustomed to large urban environment.^[162] As a complete formation the army reached the frontline in December 1944, deployed on the Sandomierz bridgehead. However, it was kept in reserve and did not fight the Germans during the Vistula-Oder offensive. Only in late January it was transferred to Lower Silesia and since early February commenced the pincer operation against Breslau, which marked the baptism of fire for many if not most of the soldiers.^[163] Though it was planned to raise the army according to the 3-corps blueprint, typical for Soviet armies, it was eventually declared battle-ready only with the 22. Rifle Corps and the 74. Rifle Corps. Moreover, instead of the usual 3 infantry divisions, the former was composed of only 2 divisions; with total strength of 5 infantry divisions, the 6. Army compared badly e.g. to the 52. Army, which when approaching Breslau was composed of 9 divisions.^{[note 59]} The bright side was that the 6. Army was not depleted by battle casualties. Its manpower was officially 34,678 men;^[164] together with soldiers from delegated units, when the siege began Gluzdovsky had 57,914 men under his command.^{[165][note 60]}

Each division should have been equipped with own divisional artillery, be it field guns (like F-22 76 mm pieces), ant-tank (M-42 45 mm or ZIS-2 57 mm pieces) or AA (61-K 37 mm and 52-K 85 mm pieces); usually they should have amounted to around 60 pieces (plus mortars), but there is no clear information available as to the number of these guns in divisions of the 6. Army. The organic army artillery was 159. Artillery Brigade; it was composed of 2 battalions (in Soviet nomenclature divizion) of ML-20 152 mm howitzers (24 pieces each) and 1 battalion of A-19 122 mm pieces (12 guns). The 531. Mortar Regiment was equipped with 120 mm mortars, while the 1587. AA Regiment fired 85 mm guns. In total, the 6. Army had 347 artillery pieces and 381 mortars at their disposal. However, there were numerous units, mostly artillery, seconded under Gluzdovsky’s command from reserve of the 1. Ukrainian Front or from other armies. The key one was the 31. Breakthrough Artillery Division; it was composed of 6 various brigades, including field (ZIS-3 76 mm), howitzers (M-30 122 mm), super heavy howitzers (B-4 203 mm), mortars (wz. 1943 160 mm), and rocket launchers (BM-13-12); in total, it delivered 255 guns and mortars.^[167] The heaviest artillery were Br-5 280 mm mortars, grouped in two separate batteries. Mobile armor support was provided by 350. Self-propelled Artillery Battery (SU-76 guns, number unclear) and 349. Guards Heavy Self-propelled Artillery Regiment (ISU-152 guns, number unclear). Units attached later provided 5 T-34 tanks, 14 IS-2 tanks, 4 ISU-122 guns and 1 SU-122 gun.^[168] In total, Gluzdovsky had around 600 artillery pieces at his disposal.

Soviet troops engaged in the siege of Breslau:^{[note 61]}

formation	type	unit	# of battalions or equivalent	manpower	manpower sub-total
6. Army	staff and command	–	1	500	34,500
	22. Rifle Corps	218. Rifle Division	12	5,500
		309. Rifle Division	12	5,500
	74. Rifle Corps	181. Rifle Division	12	5,500
		273. Rifle Division	12	5,500
		359. Rifle Division	12	5,500
	organic army units	159. Artillery Brigade	3	1,500
		563. Anti-Tank Artillery Regiment	1	500
		1248. Anti-Tank Artillery Regiment	1	500
		531. Mortar Regiment	1	500
		1587. AA Regiment	4	500
		62. Pioneer-Engineer Brigade	1	1,000
		22. & 23. Flamethrower bat.	2	1,000
		other divisional services	2	1,000
delegated units	–	77. Fortified Region	4	2,000	31,000[note 62]
		294. Rifle Division (until April)	8	4,000
		112. Rifle Division (since April)	8	4,500
		135. Rifle Division (since mid-April)	8	4,500
		23. Guards Mortar Regiment	2	1,000
		40. & 315. Mortar Batteries	1	500
		350. SP Artillery Battery	1	500
		349. Guards Heavy SP Artillery Regiment	1	500
		31. Breakthrough Artillery Division (March only)	20	10,500
		222. Tank Regiment (March only)	1	500
		87. Guards Heavy Tank Regiment (since mid-March)	1	500
		3. Guards Kiev Mortar Brigade (since April)	3	1,500
		374. Ostropol Heavy SP Artillery Regiment (since April)	1	500

The concept of turning a large city into a fortress was gradually getting abandoned by military planners since the late 19th-century, though during World War One there were few cases – most notably Przemyśl – of a long-lasting siege. Until the battle of Stalingrad in 1942-1943 there were no episodes of heavy urban combat during World War Two.^[172] However, in early spring of 1944 Hitler introduced an idea of a “Fester Platz”. It consisted of turning mid-size and large urban settlements into fortified points of resistance, capable of fighting in total encirclement for a long time. There were 29 cities on the Eastern Front (the largest ones having been Minsk, Tallinn and Vitebsk) declared “Feste Plätze” in the OKH order of March 24, 1944. New cities were being added to the list during the following months until on August 25, 1944, another OKH order declared a fortress a number of cities already in Germany; Breslau was among them.^{[173][note 64]} Detailed specifications were issued later, in particular the Befehl über Festungen of October 24, 1944.^[175] Until this point none of the fortresses, supposed to fight in encirclement, was defended longer than a few days; these were the cases of e.g. Minsk or Wilna. It took over 2 months before fortress Breslau received its commander; Generalmajor Krause, who arrived in the city in late September, was officially nominated Festung Kommandant von Breslau on October 1, 1944.^[176]

When Krause landed in Breslau there were numerous fortifications at the outskirts of the city; they were built between the 1890s and the 1910s.^{[note 65]} These Infanterie-Werke comprised concrete bunkers, shelters, artillery positions and hydrotechnical installations and were most densely scattered on the north-eastern perimeter, mostly between the Weide and the Oder; on the southern end there were rather few. No works have been carried out in the interwar period except air shelters, built since 1936; there were some 240 of them constructed.^[179] Contemporary scholar claims that in 1944 the Breslau fortifications were of some defensive potential, though in terms of military technology they remained fairly outdated.^[180] Festungsbereiches Ost, a Frankfurt-based command of Eastern Front fortresses, decided to commence additional preparations. They consisted of building a so-called Barthold-Linie, defensive line composed of infantry trenches, bunkers, anti-tank ditches, “dragon’s teeth“, shelters and artillery positions; it was placed some 10-20 km away from north-eastern borders of the city.^[181] There were scarcely any fortified positions built in the south, as it was not expected that a would-be Soviet assault might come from this direction. In the autumn of 1944 some officers of the garrison suggested that the railway embankment, running across southern suburbs, be turned into a fortified defense line. However, the military did not have own resources to launch the project, and then the Deutsche Reichsbahn protested, anxious that works would paralyse the rail traffic.^[182] Explosives were planted at bridges and similar constructions, to be blown up if needed.^[183]

Part of the fortress preparations was gathering resources needed to sustain long fighting entirely encircled by the enemy. At least 16 Kriegslazaretten and even more Feldlazaretten were prepared, with sanitary staff, medicines and appropriate materiel; this would later prove to be fairly sufficient even for 80 days of the siege.^[184] New air shelters were constructed. Huge quantities of foodstuffs were amassed; they would also turn out to be sufficient,^[185] and at surrender some logistics officers claimed that whatever remained in warehouses would suffice to sustain further few months of the siege.^[186] Massive amount of fodder was gathered for 3,285 horses in the fortress; these supplies would be almost exhausted and extreme measures would have to be undertaken.^{[note 66]} The least effective preparatons were carried out with regard to ammunition, and in particular artillery shells; they would be in constant short supply during the siege, strict limits as to number of shells to be fired daily would be introduced, and the fortress would very much rely on air supplies.^[187] A commodity in extremely short supply would be fuel, shortly to be reserved only for armored vehicles; most cars would be converted to wood gas. Last but not least, another issue not satisfactorily resolved was the line of command. Theoretically the overall responsibility for a fortress would reside with the local Reichsverteidigungskommissar, a defense commissioner; this role was assumed by the highest civilian and party authority, Hanke. However, the powers of the commissioner and these of the military commander have never been clearly separated, which resulted in Hanke assuming dominant position versus first Krause and then von Ahlfen.^{[note 67]} It was only Niehoff who upon arrival made it clear he would receive no orders from Hanke,^[189] who at this point was relegated to a secondary position.^[190]

In mid-February units of the 5. Guards Army on the eastern flank and these of the 6. Army on the western flank were holding a frontline running latitudinally some 5-6 km south of the market square; some Soviet maps from this period feature a demarcation line between assault sectors of both armies drawn up to the Hauptbahnhof.^{[note 68]} It is not clear whether when planning his advance, Gluzdovsky considered a joint operation with the neighboring army or whether he was aware that starting February 19 the 5. Guards would be being withdrawn.^[193] It is known, though, that he grossly underestimated the opponents; initially his intelligence claimed the German garrison was 18,000 men, in late February raising this figure to 31,000.^[194] This might have contributed to overly ambitious Soviet planning. Gluzdovsky ordered both divisions of the 22. Rifle Corps^{[note 69]} to advance from south-west on a section of some 2.5 km length and apparently expected them to penetrate into the inner city within a day or two.^[195] There were 572 artillery pieces amassed; the tactics was to form tens of shock groups, composed of infantry battalion with mortars and flamethrowers, pioneers,^{[196][note 70]} 2-3 guns and 2-3 gunned armoured vehicles.^[198] There were some 5,500 men in front combat sub-units.^[199] The key axis of advance was to be from Hartlieb/Oltashin across Krietern and Kleinburg towards the Hindenburg Platz. The 74. Rifle Corps was to deliver auxiliary punch from the west, from Neumarkt to Deutsch Lissa and the western suburbs.

The Soviet assault commenced on February 16;^[200] its immediate objective was the railway embankment and Südpark, located north of it.^[201] However, combat in the loosely built, half-rural suburban area produced slow progress;^[202] 3 battalions managed to cross the embankment only on February 19^[203] or 20^[204] and seized southern edge of Südpark; the following day some sub-units penetraded into Kurasierstrasse.^[205] However, counter-attacks by improvised Kampfgruppen, including companies composed of HJ Volkssturm teenagers, pushed the Soviets mostly back across the railway line;^[206] this would later give rise to the Kinder von Breslau narrative.^[207] In the West the 74. RC crossed the Weistritz^{[note 71]} and approached Schmiedefeld; paratroopers who landed on the Klein Gandau airfield on February 21^[210] managed to push the Soviets out of Schmiedefeld and stabilised the western frontline; this saved the airfield, which would be operated for further 6 weeks.^[211] It is supposed that the Soviet command was confident they would take the city in days and underestimated the importance of air deliveries; this was why until April they did not attempt further penetration in the west.^[212]

On February 22 the 22. RC resumed assault, narrowing the sector of advance.^{[note 72]} The 218. Rifle Division penetrated well north of the embankment into Kleinburg; fighting took place in suburban setting of prestigious Professoren-Siedlung, gradually giving way to densely built quarters; at this stage there were already barricades erected and passages blown up across walls of neighboring buildings.^[214] On February 22 the 309. RD reached the Kurasier-kaserne, a large barracks compound, which during next few days would be passing from hands to hands a few times.^[215] In February 22-23 the 315th Battalion fired 113 280 mm shells, at a range of 4-5 km.^[216] On February 23 the Red Army men seized the tram depot at Lohestrasse, which marked borders of dense urban infrastructure. On February 24 the Soviets for the last time re-captured the Kurasier-kaserne and firmly established themselves north of the Kurasierstrasse.^[217] During next few days their key objective was Hindenburg Platz; this is where – also along the Steinstrasse – the frontline stalled on February 26-27.^{[note 73]} On the right flank battalions from the 273 RD. seized the Städtische Gaswerk in Dürrgoy.^[219][220]

During some 10 days along the key axis of assault the Soviet troops advanced some 2.5 km^[221] and were now some 2.5 km from the market square and some 1.5 km from the Hauptbahnhof. Though falling dramatically short of gains envisioned in the original Gluzdovsky’s order, this would prove quite a success compared to territorial gains that would be recorded during assaults in March and April. Of the 3 divisions advancing, until March the left-flank 218. RD lost 2,571 men, the centrally positioned 309. RD lost 1,871 and the right-flank 273. RD lost 1,867;^[222] in total in February (including the encirclement operation) the 6. Army lost 12,499 soldiers, out of this 2,986 having been irrecoverable losses (KIA, MIA, heavily wounded).^[223] German losses are not clear. However, the “Wehl” regiment and various battle-groups, like Kampfgruppe “Zielske” or Kampgruppe “Hirsch”, which manned the western section, were withdrawn from the frontline and replaced by the “Mohr” regiment, reinforced with new VS battalions.^{[note 74]} Along the eastern section both regiments from the 609. Division, “Schulz” and “Reinkober”, remained on their positions.

In early March the Soviets kept advancing from the south along the frontline of some 4.5 km length. The 359. RD moved on the left flank from northern Krietern towards Gräbschen and Gabitz (1.5 km), west of Gabitzerstrasse. The 309. RD moved towards the centre between Gabitzerstrasse and Strasse der SA (0.7 km).^[225] The 218. RD moved towards the centre between Strasse der SA and Lohenstrasse (0.7 km).^[226] On the right flank, the 273. RD moved from Herdain and Dürrgoy towards Huben (1.5 km). The Red Army thrust focused on the 1.5 km central section between Gabitzerstrasse and Lohenstrasse; the wings were providing auxiliary support. The opposing German line-up was the “Mohr” regiment, which in late February replaced “Wehl” along Strasse der SA,^[227] the “Kersten” regiment along Lohenstrasse, and “Reinkober” on the German left flank, this is on the eastern section; all these regiments were reinforced by various improvised kampfgruppen, composed mostly of Volkssturm battalions attached to single Wehrmacht companies.^[228]

The first two weeks of March marked one of the two most fierce periods of the Breslau fighting.^{[note 76]} On the central section, riflemen from 309. and 218. rifle divisions and the opposing “Mohr” and “Kersten” defenders were engaged in combat not for single city blocks, not for single buildings, but at times for single floors.^{[note 77]} The Soviets kept advancing in their shock groups, each composed of few hundred infantry supported by pioneers blowing up walls where necessary, with field guns and self-propelled artillery placed some 150-300 metres behind. The defenders employed Goliaths^[231] and used to transport dismantled pieces, especially the Puppchen launchers, to upper floors.^[232] The district, densely built up with 3-5 floor residential buildings, many of magnificent architecture, was systematically being turned into rubble.^{[note 78]} In every week a single Soviet division was losing some 350-500 men;^{[note 79]} German losses are not clear, yet it is known they rotated the VS battalions every some time.^{[note 80]} The Soviet advance was painstakingly slow; until mid-March on the crucial central section they advanced some 350 metres, reaching Augustastrasse and Victoriastrasse; since March 10 they were making close to no progress,^[237] and since March 15 no progress at all.^[238]

Smaller scale assaults continued on auxiliary sections. In early March in the flanking south-western industrial district of Gräbschen the Soviets deployed 222. Tank Regiment, which advanced along Gräbschenerstrasse; they seized the bus depot and railway line, yet confronted by 5 platoons of Panzerjägerabteilung the tanks stalled; the entire unit was withdrawn on March 22.^[239] Around this time on the right flank the 273. RD advanced through Dürrgoy^{[240][note 81]} but failed to take the Heilig-Geist-kirche; this huge concrete construction^{[note 82]} controlled access to Huben from south-east and would remain in German hands until surrender.^[242] In the north units of the 294. RD and 77. FR with little success tried to cross the Weide, opposed by “Wehl”, “Sauer” and the paras;^{[note 83]} in late March the 294. RD was moved elsewhere and its sector was taken over by the 77. FR.^[244] In the centre, following a period of less intense combat, on March 18 and on March 25 the 218. RD renewed attacks between Lohenstrasse and Bohrauerstraße (section taken over from 273. RD), but failed.^[245] Since March 18 they were fighting against the “Besslein” regiment, as “Mohr”, in combat for 3 weeks, was sent to Klein Gandau to rest.^[246] In the second half of March the Soviets gained almost no territory, again except some success of the 309. in Gräbschen on March 28-29, where they seized train depot, sporting ground and Raabelplatz.^[247]

German losses sustained in March are unclear; a present-day historian extrapolates some fragmentary data and estimates 3,300 KIA and 12,500 WIA from mid-Feb until end-March,^[248] while the official Wehrmacht register evidenced 2,038 KIA in March and 3,006 KIA since the siege began.^[249] In March the Soviet divisions advancing in the central sector suffered over 2,000 casualties each; the 22. Rifle Corps recorded 1,350 irrecoverable casualties (KIA, MIA and very heavy WIA) out of some 6,700 total losses; the 6. Army lost in total 12,886 men, out of these 2,764 KIA. Given reinforcements were merely 2,717, at the end of March Gluzdovsky had only 41,000 men under his command^[250] and despite emergency measures, combat potential of the 6. Army was dwindling.^{[note 84]} Along the key axis of assault during the entire month the Red Army moved some 0.5 km. Though at the closest point they were some 0.8 km from the Hauptbahnhof, it seemed that their resources were running out. During the very last days of March the 309. RD was ordered to vacate their entire sector. It was to be taken over by the neighboring 218. RD, which was now stretched from 0.7 km to some 1.5 km. It was a clear sign that Gluzdovsky decided to abandon further attempts to seize the city from the south, where his troops were going into defence.^[253]

In late March Gluzdovsky prepared for assault from the west and re-grouped his troops. While the 22. Rifle Corps after 6 weeks of combat assumed defensive positions in the south, it was the 74. Rifle Corps which was now supposed to deliver a breakthrough punch. There were 3 infantry divisions marked for this task.^[254] The 294. RD (moved from the Weide front) was to advance on the left flank, on the north, from Masselwitz towards Pilsnitz and Kosel. The 359. RD (so far in the rear) was in the centre, to proceed from Schmiedefeld towards Klein Gandau. The 112. RD (fresh as reinforcement from the 13. Army)^{[note 85]} was on the right flank, to attack from Schmiedefeld towards Maria Höfchen and Klein Mochbern.^[255] All divisions manned sectors of similar length, in total amounting to some 6 km. German lines, running chiefly along the railway embankment, were defended by “Mohr” and “Hanf” regiments, with the usual VS battalions. The defenders were well aware of the threat forthcoming, as massive moves of people and machinery were easily detected; Niehoff reinforced his men by single companies of paratroopers, pioneers, SS (detached from “Besslein”) and Panzerjäger-Abteilung.^[256]

The Soviet assault commenced on March 31 and initially produced little progress.^{[note 86]} The riflemen failed to take the embankment, even at spots defended by VS.^{[note 87]} However, on April 2 a company of the 359. RD and tanks of the 222. TR achieved a breakthrough, exploited it, and reached the south-western corner of the Klein Gandau airfield.^[260] Repeated German counter-attacks failed, and on April 4 the airport was already controlled by the Soviets; fighting moved to the Breslau-Mochbern railway station. On the left flank the Soviets have crossed the Lohe, and on April 5 took the suburb of Kosel.^[261] However, by weekend the Red Army advance stalled, especially that the 294. RD was withdrawn and directed towards Berlin.^[262] The period of April 8-18 was marked by a stalemate; localised combat did not move the frontline, which remained in loosely built eastern part of the industrial district. Soviet losses were smaller than these sustained in early March.^{[note 88]} The Germans suffered record casualties; April 1 was the only day when they exceeded 120 KIA, while April 2 was one of 5 days during the entire siege, when there were more than 100 killed.^[264] Shattered battalions were merged.^{[note 89]}

On April 18 the renewed Soviet assault was commenced by the 74. RC; though it lost the 294. RD, it was reinforced by the 218. RD. The combat focused on two key objects: the large Breslauer Schlachthof slaughterhouse^{[note 90]} and even larger Linke-Hoffman Werke plant.^[267] Though the defenders eventually abandoned both, except one city block the Soviets failed to cross another railway embankment. An attempt to cross it in Schrobergarten on the left flank, performed by the 374. Guards Heavy Self-Propelled Artillery Regiment, ended in a carnage; 3 StuG guns knocked out 13 of 15 Soviet ISU-152 guns.^{[note 91]} During next few days heavy fighting along the axis of Frankfurter Strasse followed, yet with little territorial change. On April 22 Gluzdovsky re-organized his assault, and for the first time ordered the 22. And 74. Rifle Corps to advance simultaneously.^[269] Both re-launched their offensive on April 24, which commenced the second period of most ferocious combat. The Soviets engaged 6 divisions, though none had more than 3,500 people in its ranks.^[270] Listing German line-up barely makes sense, as following mergers sub-units were organized in various improvised kampfgruppen; battalions from former “Mohr”, “Hanf” and “Besslein” regiments prevailed.^[271] During 4 days of combat in partially industrial, partially suburban and partially densely built residential quarters, the frontline moved some 0.6-0.8 km; the Soviets captured a huge AA bunker at Striegauer Platz^{[note 92]} but failed to gain ground much further.

On April 28 both sides were already bleeding white; combat intensity decreased and the frontline stalled some 1.5 km from the market square^[273] and some 2.5 km from the Hauptbahnhof.^[274] Following the failed March attempt to storm the city from the south, also the April offensive from the west came to a standstill. The Red Army lost 14,252 men, including 964 officers;^[275] as reinforcements amounted to some 8,000 men, by the 1st of May Gluzdovsky had some 34,000 men under his command.^[276] German losses are not clear; Niehoff declared that during the peak combat period in April, the garrison was losing some 700 men a day,^[277] while the official register evidenced 1,929 killed in April, slightly less than in March.^[278] However, since the fall of Klein Gandau the garrison was no longer able to send their WIA out of the city; it is estimated that some 6,000 soldiers were in lazarets.^[279] Another critical problem was ammunition, especially artillery shells;^{[note 93]} technicians tried to invent improvised charges; their evaluation differs from source to source.^{[note 94]}

Once fightings along Frankurter Strasse decreased, since April 28 there were only local skirmishes recorded in the city;^{[note 95]} until surrender further 298 German soldiers died,^[284] even though some might have been WIA who perished in lazarets. In early May some 80 members of NKFD, who were earlier calling for surrender in flyers^[285] and over loudspeakers,^{[note 96]} were sent across the frontline on infiltration mission. They were identified and local combat followed;^[286] seventeen captured NKFD men were executed.^[287] On May 1 information about Hitler’s death reached Breslau; it was not made public until the following day, together with news about the surrender of Berlin.^[288] Niehoff contemplated breakout and ordered his planning officers to consider its feasibility;^[289] some decisions taken might suggest he was serious about it, and Soviets ordered specific preparations when their intelligence provided an early warning.^[290] In few days the German staff worked out their evaluation; though there were merely some 30 km to lines held by the 17. Army, with few vehicles, almost no fuel, no armoured support and lots of wounded, exhausted soldiers, they concluded that any attempt to break out would end up with a carnage.

On May 4 the Soviets came out with their offer; they proposed honourable surrender and declared unilateral ceasefire as of 6 am this day, and Red Army trucks with loudspeakers started moving along the frontline. Also on May 4 a group of Evangelical and Roman-Catholic clergy were admitted by Niehoff; they claimed the only was out was to lay down arms. Accounts from this meeting differ; it seems that the general remained polite yet non-committal.^[291] However, later the same day he invited the minister Ernst Hornig to come again and make the same representation to some 25 highest officers.^[292] Once the reverend left, Niehoff asked those gathered for their opinions. Except 4 SS officers, most of these who voiced out agreed.^[293]

It is not clear when Niehoff made up his mind. In line with Soviet proposals, early morning of May 5 he sent his envoys to the Soviets; they soon returned with Gluzdovsky’s conditions, which adhered to internationally accepted POW standards. Niehoff gathered his commanders once more, and proclaimed that he opted for surrender. The only other general present, Ruff, concurred; the only person protesting was Volkssturm commander, SS-Obergruppenführer Herzog. Either late evening on May 4 or on May 5 Niehoff contacted Schörner.^{[note 97]} According to the former, the marshall declared “I will retake Breslau. You, Niehoff, will fight until the last man”; Niehoff replied he would surrender anyway, to be treated to a firm response: “I expect of you, Niehoff, to remain faithful to our deceased Führer”. At this moment the general hung up.^[297] However, it seems that some time later Niehoff got at least a tacit approval on part of both Schörner and commander of the 17. Army, Hasse.^[298]

Either on May 4 or 5 Niehoff met Hanke, the highest civilian and NSDAP authority, who also after Hitler’s death kept declaring that the fight would go on; Hanke was aware that following deposition of Himmler, he had been nominated the SS Reichsführer. Two Niehoff’s accounts, one given to his GRU interrogators few days after surrender and another provided in his book, differ. It appears that Hanke asked for assistance to get out.^[299] The general suggested – apart from “a honourable solution” – that he might issue the gauleiter a fake Soldbuch of a private, or hide him heavily bandaged among the WIA, or clear a passage across minefields so that Hanke could make it on foot.^[300] Eventually very early on May 6 Hanke boarded a Fieseler-Storch aircraft, parked inside of the Jahrhunderthalle, and took off from the Friesenwise airstrip.^{[note 98]} It is not clear whether Niehoff approved of, authorised, merely tolerated or was even aware of the departure,^{[note 99]} especially that there the aricraft was operated by a Luftwaffe pilot.^{[note 100]}

Early morning on May 6 Niehoff sent his envoys anew: the purpose was to make sure that combatant rights will be honoured also in case of the SS soldiers.^{[note 102]} Before mid-day they were assured that SS combatants would be treated with full POW rights; on their way back they stepped on own land mine, leaving all of them wounded, one very heavily.^{[note 103]} Having received the message Niehoff wrote another message, accepting the conditions. New envoys were dispatched and crossed the frontline around 3 pm, but the Soviets were disappointed the general did not show up in person.^[309] They sent their own team, which were admitted by Niehoff in his headquarters. Eventually the general with his ADC, his batman and Soviet envoys boarded two cars^{[note 104]} and drove to the Hauptbanhof; from there they walked to Villa Colonia at Kaiser-Friedrich-Strasse, where the instrument of capitulation was signed. A banquet followed, while one copy of the document was sent to the headquarters of the German garrison. It arrived around 8 pm, shortly before Soviet troops started to enter the city.^[311] By this time Gestapo managed to execute 40 Czechs, suspected of having taken part in conspiracy and held in the Strafgefängnis Breslau prison.^{[312][note 105]}

The Luftwaffe command set up a dedicated position to co-ordinate air supplies to Breslau, Lufttransportchef der Wehrmacht beim O.K.L.; it was assumed by Friedrich-Wilhelm „Fritz“ Morzik.^[315] His assets were aircraft from 6. Luftflotte, most based near Dresden but some in Bohemia. Some 55% of sorties were performed by Ju-52 and 25% by He-111,^[316] the remaining percentage were Me-109 used as transport planes, and various types of gliders.^[317] As the primary Breslau airfield, Schöngarten, was seized by the Soviets, the remaining option was a smaller Klein Gandau airfield, located at western outskirts some 6 km from the Hauptbahnhof and around 1 km from the frontline.^{[note 106]} It was established that the minimum daily supplies should be 40 tons; some 90% was ammunition.^[318] The sorties were flown by night only. Initially Luftwaffe had little problem to meet this threshold, but since late February there was not a single week with average 40 tons of daily deliveries.^[319] This was due to shortages of fuel, aircraft and pilots, weather conditions, and last but not least, Soviet counter-measures, which included AA fire, radio deception, and own fighter squadrons. Luftwaffe started to drop containers,^{[note 107]} which after Soviet capture of Klein Gandau became almost the only way to deliver supplies. However, at best 50% of containers ended up in German hands; also, it was no longer possible to evacuate those heavily wounded.^{[note 108]} Extreme effort was dedicated to create internal airstrip along Kaiserstrasse, in a densely built western district.^{[note 109]} From March 7 till March 25 pioneers were blowing up buildings while tens of thousands of civilians and forced laborers were clearing the rubble and levelling the ground.^[323] In late March the airstrip was declared ready,^[324] yet because of its poor surface only a handful of aircraft managed to land and take off; it was rather used by gliders, with not a few fatal accidents recorded.^[325] Since mid-April Luftwaffe supplies ceased almost completely and there were days with no deliveries at all.^{[note 110]} Some authors estimate that during the siege, Luftwaffe delivered some 2,000 tons,^[327] yet others claim that this was the amount loaded and suggest that the amount delivered was below 1,000 tons^[328] while some declare 5,600 tons delivered with some 3,200 sorties flown.^[329] During the airlift, on their way back Luftwaffe evacuated some 5,200 WIA.^{[330][note 111]} It is known that until March 23 there were 84 Ju-52 and 8 He-111 lost,^{[333][note 112]} mostly due to AA fire;^[335] total figures are estimated at some 165 machines.^{[note 113]} As Hitler personally declared the aerial support for Breslau the Luftwaffe top priority, it was the last effort of German air forces of such magnitude.^[338]

The Soviets had massive air fleet available, yet there was no night fighter squadron based nearby; as Luftwaffe flew by night only, there were very few German planes shot down by Soviet aircraft.^{[note 114]} Their air activity was mostly about bombing raids. The primary aircraft was the Pe-2 bomber, though on some missions there were also Il-2 ground attack machines present.^[340] Various types of bombers were used by long-distance bombing squadrons, based on airfields in south-eastern Poland some 300 km away. One more aircraft, used in large numbers, was particularly despised by the Germans: the old Po-2 was able to fly slowly at very low altitude (and hence almost impossible to hit by Flak artillery) and strafe defenders with its machine guns.^[341] In late February and most of March there might have been 30-35 tons of bombs dropped daily, though as due to various reasons – weather including – on some days Breslau was not bombed at all, the daily average was much lower.^[342] The peak period of bombardments fell on March 31 – April 2;^{[note 115]} during the 3 days, which overlapped with the Easter period, Soviet airforce dropped 300-350 tons per day,^[344] on April 2 causing a phenomenon resembling a fire storm.^{[note 116]} Heavy bombardments continued until April 10,^[346] when the Soviets focused on operations against Berlin; in the second half of the month the tonnage dropped diminished.^[347] During the entire siege and in course of some 12,000 sorties, the Soviets dropped around 6,700 tons of explosives.^[348] Though pilots might have been instructed to target specific objects of military importance, in practice bombs were dropped chaotically on entire quarters, including residential areas; this was due to insufficient skills of Soviet pilots, hardware deficiencies, smoke covering large urban areas, military objects placed amidst living blocs, and no consideration for civilian population on part of the crews.^[349] The losses suffered were rather negligible and amounted to not more than some 15 aircraft; they were caused equally by AA artillery, German fighters and friendly fire.^{[note 117]} It remains paradoxical that like in case of the Germans, the highest ranking officer the Soviets lost during the battle was an aviator, general Ivan S. Polbin, though he was shot down shortly before the siege commenced.^{[note 118]}

A British historian claims the Germans lost around 5,700 KIA.^{[note 120]} According to von Ahlfen and Niehoff, the German garrison lost 6,000 KIA and 23,000 WIA, and these figures are frequently repeated in historiography,^[355] though a times with reservations.^{[note 121]} In the mid-1960s Polish scholars considered 6,276 KIA an understated figure.^[357] Some non-scientific sites consider 8,500^[358] or even 9,000.^[359] A scholar who specialises in Wrocław funeral history claims that out of 15,000 German soldiers buried in Breslau during the war or shortly afterwards and evidenced by Volksbund Deutsche Kriegsgräberfürsorge, only some 10% died before the siege; this would reportedly point to irrecoverable German losses of some 13,500 KIA.^{[note 122]} At least 64 Germans were executed by their own side for alleged defeatism or as deserters.^{[361][note 123]} The highest-ranking ground troops German soldier killed in Breslau identified was a major, count Adolf von Seidlitz-Sandreczki.^{[note 124]}

According to internal Soviet military reports, the Red Army suffered 7,107 KIA and 24,427 WIA.^{[364][note 125]} The number of soldiers, buried at Soviet military section of the Skowronia Góra cemetery was officially stated as 7,121.^{[note 126]} A Russian scholar opts for 7,177 KIA.^[367] Latest Polish figures based on cemetery statistics pointed to 8,000 dead. A present-day historian opts for a figure somewhere between 7,000 and 8,000 killed.^[368] Various works – usually not focused on the Breslau siege – offer estimates like 60,000,^{[note 127]} 65,000^[371] or 70,000^[372] total Soviet losses. These figures are dismissed by others,^{[note 128]} who claim 31,604^[374] or 31,500.^[375]. The highest-ranking ground troops Soviet soldier killed in Breslau identified was political commissar of battalion in the 181. RD, major Yakov I. Chapichev.^[376]

There is no register of civilian casualties. Estimates provided by some apparently well-informed individuals – e.g. by head of sanitary services in the fortress, dr Paul Mehling^{[note 129]} – point to some 80,000 dead; reportedly 50,000 perished until end of March, and 30,000 afterwards.^[378] This figure is often accepted by historians.^[379] However, in public circulation there are figures which might range from 17,000,^[380] 20,000,^[381] 29,000^{[note 130]} or 40,000^[383] to 150,000^[384] or even 170,000.^[385] To this number one might also add – though technically not victims of the siege itself – civilians who perished during evacuation in late January and those who suffered various types of violence after the war.^{[note 131]}

According to later official municipal Polish statistics, out of 32,000 residential buildings some 50,4% were damaged (including some 10,000 completely destroyed); the same percentage applies to 19,000 industrial and similar real estate. Of 620 public buildings, some 46% were more or less damaged, many beyond repair. Out of the total of 90,400 cubic metres of urban substance, some 69% were lost.^[388] The amount of rubble removed is estimated to have been between 8m cubic metres,^[389] 18m ^[390] and 25m;^[391] in comparison, 22m were removed from Warsaw in 1945–1949^[392] and 0.6m from Barcelona in 1939.^{[393][note 133]}

Some symbolic buildings, marking the city skyline and standing as icons of Breslau, were destroyed.^{[note 134]} The key example is Martin Luther Church with its 90 metre tower, the highest point in the city. Opened during a grand ceremony on anniversary of birth of Martin Luther in 1896, the church was blown up by German pioneers when building the inner city airstrip. Similar fate awaited the St. Paul Church with its iconic twin towers; it was demolished by pioneers when preparing defensive positions near Striegauer Platz.^[395] One more example is the magnificent main post office building; it was heavily damaged by artillery fire and aerial bombardments and what remained of it – according to some still suitable for repair works – was levelled by the Poles after the war.^[396] There are numerous other buildings on the list.^{[note 135]}

That at the final stage of the war, when the Germans were desperately short of people and materiel and the Soviets enjoyed massive advantage in any terms conceivable, the Breslau garrison stood their ground for almost 3 months, might be considered at least surprising. Contemporary historian put the blame mostly on shoulders of marshall Konev.

• He diverted south the 3. Guards Tank Army, one of the strongest if not elite Soviet formations on the Eastern Front, when it stood a high chance of seizing Breslau even in January^[398]
• He withdrew the 5. Guards Army from the siege, leaving Gluzdovsky with insufficient forces to capture the city during a short storming operation. The result was that though the Soviets enjoyed massive firepower and air supremacy, in terms of manpower the defenders and the attackers were of roughly similar strength, which went against common military practice^{[399][note 136]}
• He picked up the wrong army to carry out the siege. The 6. Army was among the least-equipped and smallest Soviet armies; its soldiers were poorly trained, most of them first appeared on the frontline in December 1944, they came from rural background and had no experience as to major cities.^{[note 137]} The 6. Army would have been an excellent choice to block Breslau, but not to storm it^{[401][note 138]}

However, also Gluzdovsky is considered responsible for some grave errors.

• Niehoff claimed that the Soviets failed to mount a pincer assault, and both March and April attempts were frontal attacks which he managed to stop by almost emptying other sectors of the defensive perimeter. Had the Soviets attacked from two opposite directions, the fall of the city would have been imminent^{[note 139]}
• Niehoff claimed also that the Soviets lacked flexibility and were bogged down in routine; he joked that it was possible to regulate a watch on basis of when they started the artillery fire, when they finished it, and when they commenced an infantry assault afterwards^[406]
• Another issue is that until mid-April, for 2 months Gluzdovsky was attempting to take Breslau with only 1 corps advancing; in March it was the 22. Rifle Corps, and in early April the 74. Rifle Corps; it was only in the second half of April that both corpses mounted a joint assault
• One more mistake committed in command was that apparently Gluzdovsky did not realize how important for the Germans the Klein Gandau airfield was. He allowed the late February advance from the west to stall at Schmiedefeld, did not reinforce his troops there, and focused on assault from the south. Given the German garrison was always short of artillery ammunition, delivered constantly by air, their operating the airfield for further 6 weeks significantly prolonged the battle^[407]
• Last but not least, also the Soviet intelligence is responsible for a blunder: as initially they estimated the strength of German garrison to be some 35% of the actual one, this false data contributed to miscalibrated Gluzdovsky’s tactics and misled him to produce plans and orders detached from reality^{[note 140]}

There are also major charges directed at the German command.

• the allegation most commonly raised is that defending the city might have made sense militarily until late February, when defenders engaged Soviet troops which were more needed in the west on approaches to the Neisse, and in the south on approaches to the Sudetes. Afterwards there was little point going on even from military perspective only, as it drained Luftwaffe of its last resources, which could not have been used when defending Berlin.^[409] When taking into account humanitarian and general considerations it is claimed that persistent resistance produced massive casualties especially among the civilians and ruined half of the city, which otherwise stood a high chance of surviving the war intact,^{[note 141]} like e.g. in case of Cracow.
• engaging masses of civilians from September 1944 to January 1945 to build Barthold-Linie was a waste of resources. Given highly manouvrable nature of warfare on the Eastern Front, it was unlikely such fortifications would serve their purpose; also, the project ignored a possibility of enemy assault from the south. The effort would have been much better directed if focused on enhancing defensive positions along the railway embankment in Hartlieb, Krietern, and Oltaschin^[416]
• though sanitary and food preparations were sufficient, the amount of ammunition, especially artillery rounds, was not, and led to dramatic shortages, including some types of artillery pieces allowed to fire 3-5 shells a day. However, one should also note that given permanent shortages of everything, supplying Breslau was possible only at the expense of units already fighting on the frontline^[417]
• in their book Ahlfen and Niehoff lambaste the OKH for too late appointment of the fortress commander and general staff; they claim that this alleged negligence led to the garrison having been under-staffed, under-armed, under-equipped, and under-trained^[418]

It is estimated that around 44,000 German combatants went into Soviet captivity,^[419] though until the evening of May 7 only 30,540 have been registered at control points.^{[420][note 142]} Colonels and generals were taken by cars; all others formed long columns and were marched into a few locations, where makeshift POW camps have been established; the largest one was located in Hundsfeld.^[423] None of the sources consulted provides a systematic overview of their future fate. It is unclear how many and when were released and allowed to go to Germany, either to the Soviet-occupied zone or other zones, how many were sent to Russia and how many perished; at least few thousand hospitalized died, mostly due to typhus and dystentery.^[424] Officers were first being interrogated by GRU and then, mostly in the summer of 1945, were transported east; they ended up in labor camps scattered across the USSR, Siberia included.^{[note 143]} Those who survived returned to Germany (usually the Bundesrepublik) in the 1950s, taking advantage of appropriate treaty, signed by the USSR and West Germany.

Thousands of Germans who left Breslau before the siege and settled at the Sudete foothills, returned to the half-ruined city, there were to be nick-named Rückwanderer.^[426] The highest authority there was a Soviet military commander. Initially it was unclear in what country Breslau would be, yet in line with the policy advanced by Moscow, Poles were from the onset allowed and encouraged to settle in the city.^[427] Initially there were 2 mayors: a German and a Polish one.^[428] The city was subject to immense looting. Part of the process was official and co-ordinated by Soviet authorities, as hundreds of trains were carrying eastwards whatever was deemed of major value, in particular machinery and various equipment.^[429] Part of the process was spontaneous, carried out by Soviet soldiers and especially by Polish newcomers, many arriving not to settle but to plunder as much as possible.^[430] Feeble administration structures tried to prevent looting, though initially with little effect. Local German population was subject to various types of violence. In August 1945 the Potsdam Agreement left Lower Silesia under Polish administration until a peace treaty is signed between Poland and Germany.^[431] At this point, in the summer of 1945, there were 189,000 Germans and 17,000 Poles living in the city, which was starting to transform from Breslau into Wrocław.^[432] The German population was forced to leave and the influx of Poles, particularly from former Polish territories incorporated into the USSR, continued.^{[note 144]} According to some sources the Germans became a minority already in 1946^{[note 145]}, according to other in 1947.^{[note 146]}

Among these protagonists whose fate is known, all except one died naturally. Ruff was trialed in Riga in relation to his earlier spell in the Latvian capital; he was sentenced to death and executed aged 54 in 1946. Kosolapov commanded various divisions; he died aged 52 in 1953. Vorozhyshev commanded a corps and then served as military adviser in Bulgaria; he died aged 53 in 1955. Urbatis was released from Soviet captivity in 1949 and died aged 67 in 1958. Yeroshenko served mostly at various teaching positions in military academies; retired in 1954, he died aged 60 in 1960. Ahlfen having left Breslau was posted to Heeresgruppe B on the Western Front; taken POW by the US troops, he was released in 1947, settled in West Germany and died aged 69 in 1966. Gluzdovsky served at military academy and then headed a few military districts; retired 1961, he died aged 64 in 1967. Zakharov served at various administrative posts; retired in 1953, he died aged 72 in 1968. Lev served mostly at various teaching positions in military academies; retired in 1970, he died aged 60 in 1971. Morozov commanded a corps and headed a military district; retired 1953, he died aged 77 in 1975. Sauer spent 10 years in the USSR as a POW, released he settled in West Germany and died aged 86 in 1979. Reinkober died aged 88 in 1979. Niehoff spent 10 years in the USSR as a POW; released in 1955 he settled in West Germany and died aged 83 in 1980. Kulishev served at various mostly administrative posts; retired in 1964, he died aged 83 in 1981. Wehl posed as Italian when taken into Soviet captivity; released in 1945 and initially settled in his native Erfurt, but then moved to West Germany, he died aged 88 in 1986. Krasnokutskiy commanded an artillery corps; moved to reserve in 1953, he died aged 83 in 1987. Mohr when released from Soviet captivity settled in West Germany; he died aged 80 in 1990. Besslein spent 10 years in the USSR as a POW; released in 1955 he settled in West Germany and died aged 82 in 1993. Fate of some protagonists is unknown. Hanke was last seen in Schweidnitz on May 6, 1945;^{[note 147]} Herzog refused to go into Soviet captitivy and reportedly attempted a breakout. Kersten when released from the USSR settled in West Germany and was last heard of when aged 57 in 1961. There is no information available on Hanf, Otto^{[note 148]} and Schulz.^{[note 149]} Among Soviet commanders it is only known that Pyerepelitsa moved to reserve in 1951, Sinkin in 1945, and Zhukov in 1947.

The military cemetery at Skowronia Góra, the place of heavy fighting in Februrary 1945, hosts at least 7,000 Soviet soldiers; another cemetery, located more peripherially but larger, contains remains of some 800 Soviet officers. Both were set up in the early 1950s; the graves hold Red Army men, exhumed from smaller makeshift burial places across the city. Both are maintained by the municipality and though somewhat neglected, in general they remain in decent condition. Some elements – like two tanks at the entry gate – generate some controversy, e.g. related to the Ukrainian-Russian war. There were few small obelisk-like monuments honouring fallen Soviet soldiers, located in scarcely prestigious spots like Plac Indyjski; after the fall of Communism they all have been removed.^{[439][note 150]} During the siege fallen German soldiers were buried either in existing cemeteries, in newly set up makeshift cemeteries, or in squares and parks. Burial places from those last two categories have been mostly demolished, though in some less frequented places they remained, forgotten rather than allowed to stay; over decades they were getting overgrown by vegetation and vandalised.^{[note 151]} During the 1960s and 1970s some 40 pre-war Wrocław cemeteries, some with military sections but all hugely neglected and in total decay, have been demolished with no attempt at exhumation.^[442] Since 2002 remnants of German soldiers have been systematically exhumed and removed to a large, newly set up military cemetery in Nadolice, some 15 km from Wrocław; well-maintained, it hosts German soldiers fallen during World War Two and buried in Lower Silesia.

The bunker which until April hosted the German command remains in place, though the interior is not accessible. Out of 4 huge AA bunkers one was into a museum, and another into a university warehouse; a smaller partially underground shelter at former brewery became a club.^[443] Many smaller constructions are scattered across squares or internal yards. These discovered during development works are usually demolished, though some have met a different fate.^[444] At the outskirts of Wrocław there are remnants of bunkers and concrete-reinforced trenches. Many buildings, particularly in neglected quarters, still bear bullet marks on their walls.^{[note 152]} Every some time unexploded shells are found in the city.^[446] Large quarters of central Wrocław, hosting post-war residential blocks, demonstrate the scale of destruction the city has suffered; until 1945 they were densely built-up, yet in many boroughs not a single building has been left standing. The state-managed historical museum Centrum Historii Zajezdnia holds a section, dedicated to the wartime past of the city. There is no museum dedicated to the siege, though a group of citizens launched a project to set up “Muzeum Festung Breslau” in huge anti-aircraft underground shelters below Plac Solny.^[447] Plaques or commemorative stones are dedicated to particular episodes of the siege: one to honour civilians deceased during construction of the airstrip (in nearby square), another to commemorate Czechs killed by Gestapo during last day of the siege (on prison wall), and another marking the building where the instrument of surrender has been signed (Villa Colonia). Guided tours following traces of the siege might be booked, some of them for free.^[448] A fairly active Grupa Rekonstrukcji Historycznej re-enacts scenes from the siege.^[449]

While initially in the Soviet, Polish or East German public discourse there was close to no interest related to the siege of Breslau, in West Germany the opinions were mixed. Some accounts, usually published as limited-circulation brochures – Grieger 1948,^[450] Hartung 1957,^[451] Konrad 1963^[452] – emphasized suffering of civilians and destruction of the city; they implicitly advanced the opinion that defending the city during the long siege made little sense. The boldest statement was provided by the late parish priest of St. Mauritius Kirche in Breslau Peikert; his chronicle of the siege was published posthumously in East Berlin (1966).^[453] Entirely different was the account provided by Niehoff, first in a series of interviews for Welt am Sonntag (1956)^[454] and then in the first book on the topic, written jointly with von Ahlfen (1959).^[455] This work focused rather on effort if not heroism of German soldiers, who defended their fatherland, and was based mostly on personal recollections of the two. Both interviews and the book triggered polemical response; Schlesische Rundschau, a periodical issued by the Silesian Landsmannschaft in West Germany, published a spate of articles which charged the generals with an attempt to whitewash the Wehrmacht military command.^[456]

Ahlfen and Niehoff’s book triggered also sort of a response in Poland, namely a monograph by two young Polish historians Jonca and Konieczny (1963).^[457] The work was based on already published items, Peikert’s manuscript, the press and some German documents, stored in Polish archives, mostly in Wroclaw.^[458] Both scholars claimed to have corrected alleged Ahlfen/Niehoff errors and manipulations; they also advanced the thesis about criminal decision to defend the city, and stressed destruction and sufferings; if fierce German resistance was discussed, it was mostly to demonstrate military competence of the eventually victorious Red Army. This last thread was massively exploited in popular rather than historiographic books by another Polish scholar, Majewski (1972, 1985).^[459] Three last decades of the 20th century produced a spate of books and articles partially touching upon the siege, be it wartime recollections (both Soviet and German) or scientific works on the Eastern Front. However, the work which stands out is a monumental 10-volume series (some 10,000 pages in total) of documents, collected, edited and published by Gleiss (1986-1997).^[460] The editor did not advance any particular perspective and almost all documents published come from German sources.^[461]

Arrival of the digital era and political changes in the former Communist bloc are responsible for renewed interest in the siege, for new sources having been made public, and for a spate of publications. New source base is mostly related to two massive digitalisation undertakings. One is the common German-Russian project,^[462] which made public some Wehrmacht documents, seized by the Red Army. Another is digitalising documents stored in ЦАМО.^[463] Some new books took little if any advantage of this documentation. Another volume on the siege by Hargreaves (2011)^[464] adheres to a somewhat journalistic popular format, while the ones by Gil Martínez (2011)^[465] and Bressler/Bernage (2025)^[466] are mostly about iconography. Also the Russian work of Васильченко (2009),^[467] introduces little new information; this is not necessarily the case of his following book, grossly enhanced source-wise (2015).^[468] Various detailed military issues (e.g. fortifications, paratroopers, air supplies) related to the siege were discussed in around 15 articles by Polish authors, some of them published jointly in a work edited by Głowiński (2013).^[469] One of these issues, namely Soviet airforce operations over Breslau, was discussed in a PhD dissertation by Szewczyk (2023).^[470] The last and the most extensive historiographic analysis so far is the 600-page monograph by Głowiński (2025).^[471] Based on thorough research in Russian and German sources, it offers a complete and detailed narrative, combined with new suggestions as to military dimension of the battle; the perspective advanced is that the battle was a Soviet defeat rather than a success.

In broad public discourse in Germany the siege is present due mostly to various books. The monograph by Ahlfen and Niehoff has been re-issued a number of times, the last one in 2010. Numerous personal accounts by authors who witnessed the battle went into print, most formatted as recollections from the times of youth in Breslau and only partially touching upon the siege.^[472] Some accounts are styled rather as novels, with reality and fiction difficult to discern.^[473] In social media the accounts featuring Flucht aus Breslau are barely popular;^[474] somewhat more trendy are contributions which focus on the military dimension.^[475] Perhaps the best-known representation of Breslau fightings is the 2016 half-amateur low-budget movie by Bachmann and Martin, screened by some TV channels.^[476] In Poland in social media the battle has generated some attention among the wide public during the last 10 years;^[477] newspapers and professional media, especially in Wrocław, every year either in mid-February or in early May publish related articles.^[478] The pre-war Breslau is a scene of numerous and largely popular novels of Marek Krajewski; one of them is set during the siege and many refer to it one way or another;^[479] another novel set during the siege was written by Andrzej Ziemiański.^[480] In Russia the siege might be discussed in historiographic or popular works on e.g. German fortresses^[481] or in social media,^[482] yet in general it generates little interest. In vastly popular Great Patriotic War narrative the siege does not feature prominently and unlike other battles, does not count among symbolic icons of Russian heroism; however, in some memorial compounds the Breslau fallen might be mentioned together with casualties from other campaigns.^{[note 153]}. In international cyberspace there are various myths related to the siege in circulation.^{[note 154]}

• Lower Silesian offensive
• Karl Hanke
• Hans von Ahlfen
• Hermann Niehoff
• Vladimir Gluzdovsky

• Ahlfen Hans von, Niehoff Hermann (2010), So kämpfte Breslau: Verteidigung und Untergang von Schlesiens Hauptstadt, ISBN 9783938176184
• Bressler Jacques, Bernage Georges (2025), Breslau: Une forteresse imprenable, février – mai 1945, ISBN 9782874663567
• Jonca Karol, Konieczny Alfred (1963), Upadek “Festung Breslau”
• Gil Martínez Eduardo Manuel (2015), Breslau 1945: El último bastión del Reich, ISBN 9788492714933
• Głowiński Tomasz (ed., 2013), Festung Breslau 1945. Nieznany obraz, ISBN 9788362584314
• Głowński Tomasz (2025), Festung Breslau 1945. Anatomia bitwy, ISBN 9788311172319
• Hargreaves Richard (2011), Hitler’s Final Fortress: Breslau 1945, ISBN 9781848845152
• Majewski Ryszard (1985), Wrocław godzina zero, ISBN 8303009435
• Majewski Ryszard, Sozańska Teresa (1975), Bitwa o Wrocław styczeń-maj 1945 r.
• Solarz Jacek (2007), Breslau 1945, ISBN 9788372192639
• Васильченко Андрей (2009), Последняя крепость Рейха, ISBN 9785995500520
• Васильченко Андрей (2015), Цитадель Бреслау. Последняя битва Великой Отечественной, ISBN 9785443810232

• German defensive preparations in Wochenschau news on YouTube service
• German teenagers heroically defending their city against bolshevik hordes, graphics by Herbert Smagon
• Soviet footage of the battle, including Niehoff travelling to meet Gluzdovsky on YouTube service
• Russian scholar discusses Breslau siege in detail on YouTube service
• Polish scholar discusses Breslau siege in detail on YouTube service
• British scholar discusses Breslau siege in detail on YouTube service