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Suffering-focused ethics are views in ethics that give special priority to the reduction of suffering. Some suffering-focused views hold that reducing suffering is the only moral aim, while others treat it as one aim among others, such as reducing inequality or promoting pleasure, but give it greater weight than those other aims.[1]

Types of suffering-focused ethics

The term “suffering-focused ethics” covers several normative positions that give priority to reducing suffering. One example is negative consequentialism. On this view, actions should be assessed according to whether they bring about states of affairs with less suffering. A form of negative consequentialism is negative utilitarianism, according to which one should seek to minimise aggregate suffering, counting each individual’s suffering equally.[2]

Other suffering-focused views are non-consequentialist. In suffering-focused deontological ethics, the duty to reduce suffering is treated as especially weighty and may override other duties, though it may itself be overridden in some cases. On such views, this duty should be followed even when violating it would produce a better overall outcome.[3]

Some suffering-focused views concern moral character. On these views, the aim of a moral agent is to develop attitudes and dispositions oriented towards reducing suffering. These may be described in terms of virtue, or in terms of care and responsiveness to suffering.[4]

Suffering-focused ethics and negative ethics

Some suffering-focused views have been described in philosophical literature as “negative” views, because they prioritise the reduction of negative value over the promotion of positive value.[5][6][7] The term remains common in names such as negative consequentialism and negative utilitarianism.

Role of positive value

Suffering-focused views differ over whether values other than the reduction of suffering have moral importance. Some views deny that positive values matter in themselves, and hold that only negative values are morally relevant.[8] Other views, such as tranquilist views, allow that positive states may be valuable, but only instrumentally, insofar as they prevent or reduce suffering.[9]

Lexical views hold that some values have priority over others in such a way that they cannot be outweighed by lesser values.[10] In suffering-focused versions of these views, reducing suffering takes absolute precedence over promoting value, even though the latter is worth pursuing when reducing suffering is unfeasible.[11][12][13]

Moderate suffering-focused views give greater moral weight to reducing suffering than to promoting other values or reducing other disvalues, while still treating those other concerns as morally relevant.[14]

Arguments in favour

Supporters of suffering-focused views have argued that they can account for asymmetries in population ethics. One proposed asymmetry is that there is no obligation to bring into existence an individual whose life would be good, but there is an obligation not to bring into existence an individual whose life would be bad.[15][16][17][18][19] Suffering-focused views can explain this asymmetry by giving priority to avoiding the creation of suffering over creating happiness.[20][21]

A related argument appeals to the view that it may be permissible not to benefit others, but impermissible to cause them suffering. Jamie Mayerfeld argues that many people would reject causing one person suffering in order to produce a slightly greater amount of pleasure for another person.[22]

Another argument holds that there is an asymmetry between happiness and suffering because suffering has urgency, especially in severe cases, whereas the absence of pleasure does not necessarily present an urgent problem requiring relief.[23][24][25]

Some writers also argue that suffering, including severe suffering, is widespread and can often be reduced, while intense positive experiences are rarer and harder to create.[26][27]

Criticism of the symmetry between suffering and happiness

Some normative views, including some forms of utilitarianism, treat suffering and happiness symmetrically, in the sense that a given quantity n of suffering can be offset by a given quantity n of happiness.[28]: 413 [29]: 128 [30]: 6  Karl Popper criticised this idea, arguing that utilitarianism mistakenly assumes a continuous pleasure-pain scale on which degrees of pain can be balanced against degrees of pleasure. According to Magnus Vinding, Popper’s view rejects the idea that one person’s suffering can be morally outweighed by another person’s happiness.[31]: 30 

Thomas Metzinger has also argued against a simple symmetry between suffering and happiness. He describes suffering as involving an “urgency of change”, in contrast with neutral or untroubled states, which do not demand relief in the same way.[31]: 35 

Some writers have argued that experiences regarded as neutral may be affected by subtle dissatisfaction that goes unnoticed through habituation.[32] On this view, some pursuits of happiness may instead be attempts to escape dissatisfaction, which would support giving priority to the reduction of suffering.[33]: 33 

See also

References

  1. ^ Gloor, Lukas (2016-08-26). “The Case for Suffering-Focused Ethics”. Center on Long-Term Risk. Retrieved 2026-05-27.
  2. ^ “Negative consequentialism”. Animal Ethics. Retrieved 2026-05-01.
  3. ^ Mayerfeld, Jamie (1999). Suffering and Moral Responsibility. Oxford University Press. pp. 113–116.
  4. ^ Adams, Carol J. (1996). “Caring about Suffering: A Feminist Exploration”. In Donovan, Josephine; Adams, Carol J. (eds.). Beyond Animal Rights: A Feminist Caring Ethic for the Treatment of Animals. New York: Continuum. pp. 170–196.
  5. ^ Acton, H. B.; Watkins, J. W. N. (1963). “Symposium: Negative Utilitarianism”. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes. 37: 83–114. ISSN 0309-7013.
  6. ^ Smart, R. N. (1958). “Negative Utilitarianism”. Mind. 67 (268): 542–543. ISSN 0026-4423.
  7. ^ Sikora, R. I. (1976). “Negative Utilitarianism: Not Dead Yet”. Mind. 85 (340): 587–588. ISSN 0026-4423.
  8. ^ Griffin, James (1979). “Is Unhappiness Morally More Important Than Happiness?”. The Philosophical Quarterly. 29 (114): 47–55. doi:10.2307/2219182. ISSN 0031-8094.
  9. ^ Gloor, Lukas (2017). “Tranquilism”. Center on Long-Term Risk.
  10. ^ Arrhenius, Gustaf; Rabinowicz, Wlodek (2015-06-01). “Value Superiority”. In Hirose, Iwao; Olson, Jonas (eds.). The Oxford Handbook of Value Theory. Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199959303.013.0013.
  11. ^ Rozas, Mat (2022). “Una tipología de las éticas asimétricas”. Contrastes: Revista Internacional de Filosofía (in Spanish). 27 (1): 29–40. ISSN 1136-4076.
  12. ^ Baker, Calvin (2024). “Non-Archimedean Population Axiologies”. Economics and Philosophy. doi:10.1017/S0266267124000099.
  13. ^ Vinding, Magnus (2020). Suffering-Focused Ethics: Defense and Implications. Copenhagen: Ratio Ethica. pp. 91–92. ISBN 9798624910911.
  14. ^ Tomasik, Brian (2019-11-20). “Three Types of Negative Utilitarianism”. Essays on Reducing Suffering. Retrieved 2025-07-22.
  15. ^ Elstein, Daniel J. (2005-03-01). “The Asymmetry of Creating and Not Creating Life”. The Journal of Value Inquiry. 39 (1): 49–59. doi:10.1007/s10790-006-7256-4. ISSN 1573-0492.
  16. ^ Algander, Per (May 2012). “A Defence of the Asymmetry in Population Ethics”. Res Publica. 18 (2): 145–157. doi:10.1007/s11158-011-9164-0. ISSN 1356-4765.
  17. ^ Bradley, Ben (June 2013). “Asymmetries in Benefiting, Harming and Creating”. The Journal of Ethics. 17 (1–2): 37–49. doi:10.1007/s10892-012-9134-6. ISSN 1382-4554.
  18. ^ Narveson, Jan (1978). “Future People and Us”. In Sikora, R. I.; Barry, Brian (eds.). Obligations to Future Generations. Philadelphia: Temple University Press. pp. 38–60.
  19. ^ Frick, Johann David (2014). Making People Happy, Not Making Happy People: A Defense of the Asymmetry Intuition in Population Ethics (PhD dissertation). Cambridge: Harvard University. Retrieved 2026-05-01.
  20. ^ Benatar, David (2006). Better Never to Have Been: The Harm of Coming into Existence. Oxford University Press. p. 32.
  21. ^ Rozas, Mat (2021-06-18). “Two asymmetries in population and general normative ethics”. Etikk i praksis – Nordic Journal of Applied Ethics (1): 41–49. doi:10.5324/eip.v15i1.3860. ISSN 1890-4009.
  22. ^ Mayerfeld, Jamie (1999). Suffering and Moral Responsibility. Oxford University Press. p. 145.
  23. ^ Mayerfeld, Jamie (1999). Suffering and Moral Responsibility. Oxford University Press. p. 129.
  24. ^ Vinding, Magnus (2020). Suffering-Focused Ethics: Defense and Implications. Copenhagen: Ratio Ethica. p. 30. ISBN 9798624910911.
  25. ^ Pearce, David (2005). “The Pinprick Argument”. Utilitarianism.com. Archived from the original on 2021-01-25. Retrieved 2026-05-01.
  26. ^ Pearce, David (2010). “Why be negative?”. The Hedonistic Imperative.
  27. ^ Vinding, Magnus (2020). Suffering-Focused Ethics: Defense and Implications. Copenhagen: Ratio Ethica. pp. 26–29. ISBN 9798624910911.
  28. ^ Sidgwick, Henry (1907). The Methods of Ethics. London: Macmillan.
  29. ^ Mayerfeld, Jamie (1999). Suffering and Moral Responsibility. Oxford University Press.
  30. ^ Caviola, Lucius; Althaus, David; Mogensen, Andreas; Goodwin, Geoffrey (2022). “Population Ethical Intuitions”. Cognition. 218.
  31. ^ a b Vinding, Magnus (2023). Essays on Suffering-Focused Ethics. Ratio Ethica. ISBN 979-8215591673.
  32. ^ Gloor, Lukas (2016-08-26). “The Case for Suffering-Focused Ethics”. Center on Long-Term Risk. Section III. Retrieved 2026-05-27.
  33. ^ Vinding, Magnus (2020). Suffering-Focused Ethics: Defense and Implications. Copenhagen: Ratio Ethica. ISBN 9798624910911.

Further reading